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INTRODUCTION 
In February 1979 a popular revolution in Iran, widely supported by both 
secular and traditional forces, succeeded in overthrowing a monarchy and a 
system of government dedicated to modernization and Westernization by any 
means and at any cost.1 Although many secular forces were involved in the 
opposition to the regime from the beginning, gradually the system's ruthless 
policies against public expression eliminated the development of any 
legitimate outlet for grievances and discouraged any active public 
participation in the formation of policies, thereby silencing many of its 
opponents. The only resistance the government failed to eradicate came from 
tradition-oriented and religious groups, and the mosque. Thus, gradually the 
leadership of the opposition was garnered by the Ayatollah Khomeini, who 
was still abroad, through his widespread organizational networks operating in 
thousands of small and large community mosques throughout Iran. Khomeini 
became the unifying element in the wide spectrum of the opposition to the 
system. 
If experts on Iranian society were surprised by the sudden resurgence of 
religious sentiments, the domination of the revolution by the religious forces, 
and the final result — the Islamic Republic of Iran — the religious 
community was not. Religious leaders claim that the seeds of the revolution 
of 1978-1979 were sown in the June 1963 uprising. If they are right, one 
could make the analogy that, as the Tobacco revolt of 1891-1892 was a 
prelude to the Constitutional revolution of 1906-1911, the June 1963 uprising 
could well be considered the prelude to the revolution of 1978-1979. 
This essay attempts to show that what was really missing from the 1963 
uprising in Iran was a nationwide organization that could take advantage of 
thousands of independent community mosques and neighborhood Religious 
Gatherings (hay'at ha-yeh mazhabi) to mobilize the opposition and unite the 
diverse and often conciliatory leadership. Khomeini created such an 
organization after 1963. Khomeini's charisma and his nationwide 
organization succeeded not only in bringing down a regime assumed to be 
invincible, but also in installing an Islamic Republic strong enough to pass the 
test of time — its first decade. 
THE 1963 UPRISING 
On 22 March 1963, the Faiziyyeh Madrasa (seminary) and Mosque in 
Qum, the stronghold of the religious opposition, was attacked by the security 
forces. Many students were killed and the school was almost destroyed.2 On 
2 June 1963, the day of Ashura,3 Ayatollah Khomeini delivered a sermon at 
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Faiziyyeh, warning the Shah of the people's anger at his relationship with 
Israel and his "treacherous" acts committed in Faiziyyeh. On the same day 
Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, a controversial preacher, delivered another sermon 
in the Mosque of Sayyid Aziz Allah in Tehran, for the first time attacking the 
government directly and, in the tradition of early Islam, withdrawing public 
allegiance from the government by impeaching it in the mosque.4 
Listening carefully to Falsafi's sermon, one realizes its political and 
ideological content. What he preached on that special day as a religious 
sermon was indeed an ideological speech, and in Alvin Gouldner's words: "a 
paradigm of a rhetoric that could mobilize men to deeds."5 Three days later 
the resistance spoken of in Falsafi's sermon materialized, brought on by 
Khomeini's arrest. 
At 3:00 AM on 5 June 1963, Khomeini was arrested in Qum and taken to 
Tehran. Iran's major cities went through two days of bloody riots which 
claimed hundreds of lives. Thousands of angry demonstrators took to the 
streets in Tehran and in a selective fashion set fire to cinemas, banks, and 
government buildings; they even destroyed the traffic lights and telephone 
booths, which evidently they considered to be signs of modernization and 
Westernization. Many demonstrators wore white shrouds over their regular 
clothes symbolizing their readiness to die, and they died by the hundreds 
when government troops opened fire on them. Mourning ceremonies took 
place for these victims (martyrs), as well as 40th day commemorations as is 
the tradition in Shi'ite Islam. But this incident, though very dramatic, failed 
to precipitate a revolution in Iran. The revolution had to wait another fifteen 
years to develop and mature. 
The major reason for the failure of the June uprising was the spontaneous 
nature of the rioting. In 1963 the religious institutions, though in operation, 
did not have a defined goal nor unified leadership. The 1963 uprising after 
Khomeini's arrest was a collective but unorganized and spontaneous action 
carried out by religiously-oriented shopkeepers and bazaaris, students and 
slum dwellers. 
On 4 June 1986, during the annual ceremony commemorating the June 
1963 uprising, Hojat al Islam Khamene'i, then President of the Republic, 
spoke of the significance of the 1963 event to the 1978-1979 revolution: 
The June uprising was very important to our movement. 
That event determined the direction of the revolution, from 
a nationalistic or class struggle to a 100% religious 
revolution. The June uprising was not organized and Tehran 
was not prepared for the riot. The only factor that 
motivated people to pour into the streets was religious 
sympathy. The 1963 suppression of the uprising was not a 
failure of the revolution, but a realization of the 
shortcomings: a need for an organization and to educate 
the public. A movement needs organization, ideology and 
qualified leaders to take advantage of each suppressed 
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uprising and use it to develop the movement, otherwise 
movements will die as soon as they start.6 
The government's brutal and uncompromising response to the 1963 uprising 
did stop the movement from becoming a revolution, but its policy to curb the 
1978 revolution failed. What happened during these fifteen years that made a 
successful revolution out of a failed uprising? 
ORIGINS AND BACKGROUND OF THE 
REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP 
The spontaneous uprising of 1963 was ruthlessly crushed by the Shah's 
security forces, and Khomeini was subsequently exiled. With Khomeini in 
exile and the remainder of the high clergy silent, the government assumed 
that the problem had ended. The government embarked on grandiose projects 
funded by mounting oil revenues which by 1964 reached $555 million and 
continued to climb to approximately $20 billion by 1975-1976.7 Although 
the Shah's land reform provided many peasants with title to their land, large 
landlords managed to find loopholes and retained their holdings. Some even 
exchanged their less fertile lands for shares in government-owned industrial 
plants, thus diversifying their assets and making more money. Millions of 
rural wage earners, whom land reform had bypassed, and former nomads 
whose migratory routes had been closed off, left rural areas, heading for 
major cities where higher wages, paved streets and high-rise buildings 
seemed attractive. Most of these immigrants found the capital city of Tehran, 
where most of the oil money was spent, a more desirable place to be. 
Tehran's population grew from 1,512,000 in 1956 to 2,720,000 in 1966 to 
reach just under 4,000,000 on the eve of the revolution.8 
Those who remained in the villages and tilled their newly acquired lands 
did well initially, but the government's ill-advised policies soon put them out 
of business. To satisfy ever-increasing demands by the affluent urban 
population for more and better quality food, the government embarked on a 
massive importation of food from the USA and Europe and reduced its high 
price by subsidizing it. Thus, American rice sold for less than local rice at the 
market. The same was true for other agricultural products. Therefore, many 
fanners were forced out of business and eventually joined the swelling 
migration to the cities. Moreover, the introduction of capital-intensive 
technology to agriculture, and the formation of many large agro-business 
enterprises, both by Iranians and foreigners, reduced the need for 
farmworkers. This created a higher unemployment rate in rural areas and 
pushed many off the land to the already overpopulated cities, thus 
exacerbating the glut in the labor market.9 
In addition to this unprecedented and unplanned urbanization, rapid 
economic development doubled the size of the salaried middle class and 
produced a fivefold increase in the working class. Massive oil revenues 
raised the GNP per capita fivefold from $200 in the early 1960s to more than 
$1,000 in the mid-1970s and inflated expectations for a better future by those 
benefiting from the economic growth. As the country's income increased the 
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disparity between the rich and the poor also increased. The import of 
sophisticated Western technology required the presence of thousands of 
foreign technicians who earned incredible salaries, filled night clubs, bars and 
discotheques, and demanded more Western culture and Western products. 
Despite all of this economic growth, the population was left to starve for 
political and intellectual development. The state monopoly over politics and 
the heavy hand of the notorious secret police SAVAK ensured that absolute 
conformity by Iranian citizens was maintained. The Shah and his family ran 
Iran as they managed their own households, with no form of accountability.10 
The growing number of those who were unhappy with the regime — finding 
no legitimate outlet for their dissent — gradually turned to underground 
organizations. 
On 8 February 1971, an armed attack by a small group of young leftists 
upon a gendarmerie post on the edge of the Caspian forests shattered the 
opposition's fearful silence.11 This incident gave notice that secular 
opposition forces were joining the struggle. The opposition saw this struggle 
as a fight against dictatorship, corruption, exploitation, unequal distribution of 
reward and punishment, and domination of the economy, polity and culture 
by foreign powers. By the mid-1970s rising inflation had eroded the 
spending power of the middle class, and the government's unwarranted attack 
on the bazaar and merchants in the name of "anti-profiteering" turned both 
the secular and the traditional middle class against the regime. By 1976 U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy had drawn attention to the 
excesses of the Shah's regime and encouraged many secular, middle class 
politicians and lawyers to form organizations and join the opposition.12 But 
the secular opposition was divided, small, lacked credible leadership, and had 
no grassroots organizations to carry out a nationwide movement. The time 
was ripe for the religiously-oriented opposition to take the lead in the 
revolution. 
THE RELIGIOUSLY-ORIENTED OPPOSITION 
After 1963, and especially during the 1970s, Khomeini gradually 
emerged as the dominant force representing all independent opposition 
groups — excluding the Iranian Left — advocating a radical and 
uncompromising program of action — "the Shah must go."13 A massive 
organizational structure already existed in Iran that included about 80,000 
community mosques and 200,000 mullah's — religious functionaries who 
enjoyed economic and cultural independence from the government. In 
addition to the regular mullah's, thousands of volunteer organizers of 
processions and religious occasions were in direct contact with the population 
in different communities. By 1974 there were 12,300 religious associations 
and nearly 5,000 organizations in Tehran alone.14 The neighborhood 
organizations were often centered in the community mosques and were 
independent of each other and from the state. Every community mosque has 
always been an independent social and political institution, financed and 
administered by the community. In the 1970s Khomeini's organization 
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managed to pool all of these resources, centralize their activities, unite them 
behind Khomeini and for the first time give them direction. 
During the revolution all of these diverse and widely scattered 
organizations came under an umbrella organization called the Coalition 
Councils (hayat-ha-ye mo'ta-lefe) which was responsible for coordinating the 
activities of the religiously-led opposition in Iran. These included distributing 
leaflets and pamphlets; planning demonstrations; communicating with 
Khomeini in Iraq; and collecting money from merchants and shopkeepers to 
finance the movement. The Coalition Council was also responsible for the 
reproduction and distribution of Khomeini's tapes and written materials, 
which were smuggled into the country by thousands of pilgrims visiting the 
shrine city of Najaf (Khomeini's city of exile in Iraq) every year.15 
Some high Ulama living under the Shah's brutal system in Iran were 
hesitant to show their opposition, and were encouraged (threatened or co-
opted) to compromise with the Shah. However, Khomeini's firm stand and 
the support he was receiving from the lower rank clerics and religiously-
oriented underground organizations forced them all to follow his direction. 
The program presented by Khomeini was the most radical at the time and 
proved to be the only one able to unite all of the opposition forces and 
neutralize the Left in Iran, who could neither challenge nor offer a better 
program. 
ORGANIZING THE DISCONTENT 
As a demonstration it was unique in the experience of 
modern Iran. At least a hundred thousand Iranians 
participated in the march —well organized and marshalled 
in their parade with almost military efficiency. The 
marshals themselves were young men, often moving on 
Honda motorcycles ahead of the route of march, organizing 
traffic, blocking cross streets, and preparing the right of 
ways. There were Walkie-Talkie radios, first aid groups, 
water and refreshment units, as well as cheerleaders. 
Groups in the march were drawn largely from the 
congregations of various mosques. All in all, it was an 
awesome display of political power on behalf of the Islamic 
opposition.16 
At least four important factors contributed to the mobilization of the 
discontented during the development and process of the Iranian revolution of 
1978-1979. These factors include: the historical affinity and alliance 
between the community mosque and the institution of the bazaar; the 
community mosque as a center of mobilization; the ideology of resistance to 
unjust authority which contains within it the Karbala paradigm and 
glorification of martyrdom;17 and the organization of the discontent. The rest 
of this essay will concentrate on this last point. 
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The importance of pre-existing organizational networks is stressed in 
almost all of the theories on social movements (excluding the mass society 
approach), especially those associated with the resource mobilization 
approach.18 This important factor, critical to understanding the process behind 
the mobilization of the revolution and especially its outcome, is missing from 
most of the books and articles written on the Iranian revolution. One major 
problem in describing the pre-existing organizational network in Iran is the 
lack of reliable information, which was due to the underground nature of the 
movement. What this essay presents here on the religious organizations is 
what is written by religiously-oriented scholars and the participants 
themselves (almost all in Farsi). 
The Underdevelopment of 
Secular Political Organizations in Iran 
The dictatorial and absolutist nature of the state in Iran prevented the 
formation and development of secular organizations as well as mass 
participation in politics and nation-building. The better-organized secular 
parties or organizations, such as the Tudeh party or the National Front, 
originated either when the state was weak and impotent, or during a short-
lived, relatively democratic phase enjoyed just prior to and during the 
Mossadeq period (1950-1953). The Tudeh party emerged after the Second 
World War and the abdication of Reza Shah, and grew during the years the 
young king took to establish his grip on the throne.19 After the 1953 coup and 
the growing power of the state, the government outlawed the Tudeh party and 
all other political organizations. Many prominent Tudeh members were 
executed, some left the country, others joined the government, and the rest 
went underground. The effect of the government's repression was to lead the 
opposition to form secret societies through communal, religious and family 
networks, where public opinion was formed and informal politics were played 
out. Among these underground organizations, only those with access to 
community networks survived and developed as conditions changed. 
It was Lenin who repeatedly emphasized the importance of organization 
for a successful revolution: "Give me an organization of revolutionaries, and 
I will overturn Russia."20 The Left and other modern status groups in Iran, 
however, lacked the organizational privileges enjoyed by the traditional 
forces. Those who did organize were victorious in the revolution and thus, 
ironically, it was neither the Left nor the modern groups but the traditional 
forces who succeeded. 
The Development of Religiously-Oriented 
Political Organizations in Iran 
Community-based resources as a source of viable political opposition 
organizations in Iran have historical roots as far back as the Constitutional 
revolution (1906-1911). During the Constitutional revolution at least five 
secret societies emerged that played a significant role in both supporting and 
safeguarding the revolution. 
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Nazim al-Islam Kermani, a founding member of the most important of 
these organizations, The Secret Society, has described their recruitment 
procedure. The founding members were longtime friends and associates who 
knew one another through mosque-related activities and recruited new 
members through this informal network. Both the religious leaders and the 
bazaar merchants had close ties and interaction with associates in other cities 
and towns. This recruitment model was used to mobilize sympathizers and 
organize mass strikes in Tehran, Qum, Tabriz and other cities to force the 
reluctant Shah to grant the constitution. This successful model for 
revolutionary organization set a precedent for future revolutionary 
mobilization.21 
Islamic Coalition Councils 
(Hayat-ha-ye Mo'ta-lefeh-ye Islami) (HMI) 
The importance of pre-existing community organizational networks in 
revolutionary situations has already been stressed by many scholars. William 
S. Allen attributed the success of the German Nazi party to hundreds of pre-
existing clubs, religious organizations, patriotic societies, economic and 
occupational associations, societies for interest groups, and drinking circles.22 
Crane Brinton stressed that the pre-existing organizational network of literary 
societies, and to a lesser degree, masonic lodges, was responsible for the 
Jacobin rise to power in the French Revolution. These literary societies 
included representatives of all branches of the middle class — merchants, 
lawyers, doctors and rentiers — and were not merely men of letters.23 
During the development and process of the Iranian revolution of 1978-
1979, hundreds of open and underground organizations from both sides of the 
political spectrum existed. If one were to identify only one religious group 
that qualified as a genuine coalition organization, it would be the the Islamic 
Coalition Councils or the Hayat-ha-ye-Mo'ta-lefeh-ye Islami (HMI). 
The HMI was formed by Khomeini in March 1963 in Qum. The group's 
political activities increased after the unsuccessful 1963 uprising. It 
functioned as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of the 
religiously-oriented opposition groups, including those formed in the 1970s 
that advocated guerrilla warfare. The first flyer written by the organization 
was distributed in Tehran on 16 September 1963. The flyer condemned the 
"illegal" election and called for a one day mass strike as a sign of sympathy 
and cooperation with strikes in other cities and towns.24 Another important 
action taken by the HMI occurred on 27 October 1964, when it issued a 
statement condemning the granting of "capitulation" rights to Americans in 
Iran. The HMI managed to organize 500 youths from the bazaar and Tehran 
University to distribute 40,000 flyers in Tehran.25 
The central core of the organization was composed of twelve people 
representing three major religious gatherings (Hayat-hay-i Dim) in Tehran: 
the Society of the Bazaar of Darvazeh (Hayat-i Bazaar-i Darvazeh), 
represented by Mahdi Araqi, Habiballah Shafeeq, Habiballah Asqarowladi, 
and Aboulfazi-i Tavakkoli-Bina; the Society of Shaykh-ali Mosque (Hayat-i 
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Masjid-i Shaykhali), represented by Sayyid Assadallah Lajwardi, Haj Sadeq 
Amani, Mohammad Sadeq Islami, and Abass Modaressi-Pard; and the 
Society of Isfahanis Residing in Tehran (Hayat-i Isfahanian-i Moqim-i 
Tehran), represented by Ezatallah Khalili, Mahdi Bahadouran, Sayyid 
Mohammad Mirfenderesky, and Ala-addin Mir Mohammad-Sadeqi. The 
Council, according to Khomeini's order, elected five members to work as a 
liaison between the group and Khomeini. The five members elected by the 
group were Ayatollah Mortaza Motahheri, Doctor Sayyid Mohammad 
Beheshti, Hojat al-Islam Moha'adin Anvari, Ali Golzadeh Gafouri, and 
Shaykh Ahmad Molla'ie. Doctor Mohammad Javad Bahonar was elected as 
the coordinating officer, and Shaykh Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani became the 
speaker for the Council. Rafsanjani was also given the responsibility of 
forging an alliance with the Mujahedeen organization. The deal went sour 
and the connection was discovered by SAVAK when a member of the 
Mujahedeen Vaheed Afrakhteh confessed under torture. Rafsanjani was 
arrested for the last time and locked up for three years in the notorious Evin 
prison, where he was repeatedly tortured. He was freed when revolutionaries 
stormed the prison on the eve of the revolution.26 
The original members of the HMI were schoolmates from a religious 
high school in Tehran (Al-Ahmad) who had formed an organization called 
Shi'ites Groups (Grooheh-i Shiayan) in 1952-1953. The Shi'ites Group's 
first involvement in national politics occurred during the nationalization of 
the oil industry from the British by Mossadeq in 1953. The organization had 
three branches or departments: leadership, cultural and finance.27 They 
carried out recruitment through the pre-existing networks of the community 
mosques, religious gatherings, and Quran reading classes from all. over Iran. 
These neighborhood, grassroots organizations were connected along ethnic, 
family and occupational lines, linking together in an expanded network of 
interpersonal relationships all of the communities involved in the struggle.28 
In December 1964, some members of the Ulama in Tabriz, including 
Ayatollah Qazi Tabataba-i and Hojat al-Islam Sayyid Ahmad Khosrowshahi, 
both members of the Council, were arrested. In response to this government 
action the bazaars of Tabriz and Tehran closed for four days. 
After the assassination of Prime Minister Hasan-Ali Mansur in January 
1965, the government discovered the Council and arrested some of its 
members. Early in 1966, Hojat al-Islam Hashemi-Rafsanjani formed the 
second HMI by regrouping the remaining members and recruiting new ones. 
Some of the members in prison kept the organization active. Among them 
were Raja'i, Bahonar and Jallal-ad din Farsi, who later occupied senior 
positions in the revolutionary government.29 Once out of prison, they formed 
the Refah Foundation as a front for their political activities, and Raja'i 
became principal of a religious high school for girls — also called Refah in 
Tehran.30 The organization developed new strategies as the revolution 
evolved further. They published a newsletter, Vengeance (Enteqam). The 
HMI's activities expanded to other cities, especially Qum, Isfahan, Shiraz, 
Dezful, Qazvin, Shahi, Kashan, Yazd and Tabriz, through the active 
organization of the community mosques. In Qum, for example, the HMFs 
12 
Conflict Quarterly 
activities were managed through the Society of Religious Teachers of Qum 
(Jame'i Modaressin-i Hozeh-ye Elmieh-i Qum) under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Quddusi.31 During the month of fasting (Ramazan) of 1978, thirty 
Friday Imams, who gathered at the home of Hojatal-Islam Morvarid in 
Tehran, to coordinate the Friday sermons and the ceremonies of the coming 
holidays, were arrested by the SAVAK and released the next day.32 
By 1975, religious councils had been set up all over Iran and at most of 
the government institutions as Quran reading classes. The Quran reading 
classes were used as the front for the nationwide underground organization 
which was run through the community mosques.33 Even the most 
Americanized government institution, the Royal Airforce, was infiltrated. 
Mohammad Taheri, a cadet who was a member of the religious organizations 
within the Airforce, pointed out the existence of Quran reading classes at all 
of the major Airforce bases, including Dezful, Hamadan, Tehran, Mashad, 
Isfahan and Kish Island. The contact person for the Airforce cadets was a 
man known to the religious underground organizations as Sayyid Ali 
Andarzgu. Andarzgu, a preacher at the Shemiran Mosque, turned to guerrilla 
warfare as a member of the Fadayeen Islam. Andarzgu (real name: Shaykh 
Abass Tehrani) had joined the HMI in 1969. He was an active participant in 
Mansur's assassination. Never caught, he was sentenced to death in absentia 
by a military court. Andarzgu was also the HMI's contact with the PLO for 
smuggling arms into the country and sending volunteers to the training camps 
at Lebanon. 
The HMI included many middle class organizations.34 The largest and 
perhaps most important was the Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI), which 
was founded in 1961 by engineers and entrepreneurs, Mahdi Bazargan, 
Yadollah Sahabi and a prominent clergyman Ayatollah Taleqani. Bazargan 
was sent by government (Reza Shah) scholarship to France. After graduation 
he taught at Tehran University's College of Engineering (Daneshkadeh-i 
Fanni-i Tehran). Bazargan, Sahabi and a few others infused the ideas of 
political freedom and equality into the receptive environment of the college. 
Due to their exposure to progressive Islamic and Western ideas, they were 
sensitive to students' demands and perhaps also affected by some radical 
students from the Left. A devoted Muslim influenced by Western ideas 
during his studies in France, Bazargan, like his counterpart, Ali Shariati, were 
two social engineers who wanted Western technology but opposed the 
infiltration of Western culture; they did not want the whole "package" of 
modernity.35 Thanks to Bazargan, Sahabi, and others, Tehran University's 
College of Engineering became a hotbed of revolution. The number of 
guerrillas who died between 1963 and 1971 was estimated to be 139. Among 
these the largest group — thirty-six people or 26% — were engineers 
graduating from this college. They were mostly from a Marxist, Fadayeen 
organization; some were members of the Mujahedeen.36 
The Religiously-Oriented Guerrilla Organizations 
The guerrilla groups from Tehran and other cities represented in this 
coalition included the Devotees of Islam (Fadayeen-i Islam).37 The Fadayeen 
13 
Spring 1990 
organization was formed in 1945 by Sayyid Mojtaba Navvab Safavi in 
Tehran. It supported the nationalization of the Iranian Oil Company by Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in the 1950s. The core group of Fadayeen 
was comprised of some forty or fifty members who were spread throughout 
Iran. The general membership was large, about 20,000 to 25,000 members in 
Tehran, and another 12,000 to 15,000 in various cities, especially Mashhad.38 
The Fadayeen was the earliest group who advocated an armed struggle. 
They were responsible for assassinating Kasravi, an anti-cleric lawyer in 
1946, Abdul-Husayn Hazhir, a former Prime Minister and the Minister of the 
Court in 1949, General Ali Razmara, Prime Minister in 1951, and Dr. Abdul-
Hamid Zangeneh, the Dean of the Law Faculty, also in 1951. The Fadayeen 
was less active after the 1963 uprising but worked loosely with the Ulama, 
especially with Ayatollah Taleqani. Some members in the Bokhara-i Group, 
which was responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Mansur, were 
members of the Fadayeen. 
Another religiously-oriented guerrilla organization was the Abuzar 
Group (Grouh-i Abuzar) from Nahavand. This group started in the early 
1970s as an anti-Baha-i group (Anjuman-i Zed-i Baha-iyat), which was 
connected to similar organizations in other cities. After the Anjuman was 
closed, the Abuzar group went underground. Each member went to a mosque 
and established Quran reading sessions. In 1972, some of the members were 
arrested, and the group became more radical. Under the influence of a 
preacher (Oshkouri), it took up arms and waged a struggle against the 
government. The Abuzar Group firebombed a cinema and a few government 
official automobiles. As well they carried out the "revolutionary execution" 
of a wealthy man (Mahmud mo'meni-Dakha) who practiced usury and 
charged the poor exorbitant interest. Finally, in February 1973, during an 
assault on the Qum police station, three members died and the rest of the 
group was discovered; six members were executed. The members of the 
Abuzar Group were mostly high school students, and the nine leaders were 
related by blood or marriage. In 1975, after the execution of its leaders, the 
remaining members again regrouped (within the HMI organization) and 
continued their fight during the revolution of 1978-1979.39 
A third guerrilla organization was the Mahdiyyun Group (Gorouh-i 
Mahdiyyun), which originated in Isfahan. It was formed in 1975 by ex-
members of the Mujahedeen Khalq Organization. This group was composed 
of family and friends and contained two women. One died with her husband 
and newborn baby in an armed clash with the security forces, when their 
team-house in Tabriz was discovered by SAVAK in early 1977. The second 
woman, "martyr" Tayyebeh Va'zi-Dahnavi, was arrested and tortured to 
death. The membership of the Mahdiyyun Group consisted of people older 
and more diverse in age than those of the Abuzar Group. Among them was 
Tayyebeh's brother, Mortaza, who was a university student. 
Another organization was the Dawn of the Revolution Group (Gorouh-i 
Fajr Inqelab), which was initiated in Tehran in 1973. In 1974, Hamid Reza 
Fatemi, one of the founders of the group, who was a student at the Ariamehr 
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University, was arrested and executed along with fourteen other members. 
This group claimed to have destroyed the Shams Brewery in Tehran, the 
office of a pornographic journal {Movie Stars), the office of the university 
security guards, and the first movie theatre ever built at Qum (The Golden 
Gate Cinema). Subsequently, the land on which the theatre had stood was 
bought by Ayatollah Shahab al-Din Najafi. The Shahabiyeh school, and a 
religious school with a library, a printing press, and a clinic for the clergy 
were built there. 
A fifth group was the Party of Islamic Nations (Hezb-i Mellal-i Islami). 
It originated within the bazaar's theological college in the early 1960s. 
Among the leadership of the Party were such prominent religious leaders as 
Shaykh Mohammad Javad Hojjati Kermani and Mohammad Kazim-i 
Bojnurdi, the son of Ayatollah Bojnurdi. The Party's membership consisted 
of thirty-nine high school students, six teachers, five college students, three 
engineers, one ruhani and one high school graduate. They published thirteen 
issues of a newsletter (Khalq). In early September 1974, government security 
forces discovered the Party. They surrounded its members at their training 
camp in the Shahabad mountains (a suburb of Tehran), and arrested fifty-five 
guerrillas. A military court sentenced eight members to death, and the rest 
received prison sentences ranging from three years to life. Among the 
members who received prison terms, but who survived and were later given 
senior posts in the revolutionary government, were Bojnurdi (who became the 
governor of Isfahan), Hojjati Kermani (who was elected from Tehran to the 
first House of Representatives after the revolution); and Duz Duzani (director 
of the Revolutionary Guards, and later Minister of Information). 
Another group, the Bukhara-i Group, was responsible for assassinating 
Premier Mansur in January 1965, for his role in presenting the Forced Law 
(known as the Capitulation Law) to the House. The Forced Law would 
extend diplomatic immunity to all Americans in Iran. This sensitive issue 
was exploited by Khomeini, who accused the Shah of selling the country to 
the Americans for the $200 million loan he subsequently received. Among 
those arrested were Mahdi Araqi, Habiballah Asgar Owladi, Hojat al-Islam 
Anvari, and Haj Sadeq Amani, prominent members of the HMI. Mohammad 
Bokhara-i and three others were executed, five received prison sentences 
ranging from five to fifteen years, and four received life in prison. Among 
those who were sentenced to life imprisonment, Habiballah Asgar Owladi 
became Minister of Commerce in the post-revolution Raja'i government.40 
Other smaller, religiously-oriented guerrilla groups included the Ansari 
Group (Grouhe Ansari) in Shiraz; the Call of The Masses (Faryad-i Khalq) in 
Karaj, a suburb of Tehran; the Mansuroun Group (Gorouheh Mansuroun) and 
the Group of the True Shi'ites (Gorouh-i Shi'iyan-i Rastin) in Hamadan; the 
Valasar Group (Gorouh-i Valasar) and the Sarbdaran Group (Gorouh-i 
Sarbdaran) in Mashad; the Al-fajr Group (Gorouh-i Alfajr) in Zahedan, and 
the Allah-Akbar Group (Gorouh-i Allah O-Akbar) in Isfahan. There is no 
information, however, on their activities or their membership. 
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The Student Opposition 
In addition to these early groups, there were the university students' 
Islamic Councils, which by early 1978 dominated the leadership of the 
student organizations opposing the regime. By 1977-1978, Iran had 21 
universities and 206 institutions of higher education with a total of 160,000 
students. There was a major Iranian student organization in exile 
(Confederation of Iranian Students Abroad) that numbered over 60,000, and 
included both past and current students opposing the regime. Iranian 
university students played an important role in the revolution. Coming mostly 
from the traditional middle class, they soon joined the religious organizations 
and became active in demonstrations and strikes.41 At the beginning student 
opposition advanced economic and secular grievances, such as housing 
shortages, high tuition, and lack of freedom. Gradually, it turned to political 
issues which later became dominated by religious slogans and the symbolic 
language of conflict and protest. In February 1969, the government-run bus 
company raised the fare to more than three times the original fee. Tehran 
University students, joined by students from other colleges and universities 
and even high schools, called for a bus boycott. At this time the slogans were 
still secular. The students chanted a part of a poem by Hamid Mossadeq, a 
secular poet with a Leftist orientation: 
If I sit, if you sit, who is going to rise? 
If I rise, if You rise, we all will rise. 
The Tehran bus boycott gradually spread and involved the millions of 
people who used the bus every day. Finally, when a high school student 
(Javad Rahnama-Chitsaz), burned himself alive with gasoline, the whole city 
went on a rampage. The security forces clashed with the demonstrators who 
turned over buses and ticket booths, and then set fire to them. The Tehran 
bazaar was closed. Finally, the government was forced to reconsider, and, on 
24 February, radio Tehran announced that the Shah had ordered the fare to be 
rolled back to its original rate. 
In August 1977, students, this time claiming food shortages, again fought 
with the security forces. Rural immigrants, whose houses had been 
demolished by the government because they did not have building permits, 
also clashed with the police. In November and December, sporadic and 
spontaneous strikes and demonstrations occurred in several factories in the 
southern part of Tehran. By October 1977, Tehran University students 
demonstrated their religious fervor when, in masks, they distributed 
pamphlets demanding a total separation of male and female activities outside 
the classroom and warning female students that any violation of this Islamic 
stricture would result in death. 
Double Sovereignty and the Emergence 
of Revolutionary Power 
By the end of 1977 there were indications that a limited double 
sovereignty existed in many mid-sized, religiously-oriented cities, where the 
mosque was the center of authority and not the government. Dehqani-Tafti, 
Bishop of the Episcopal church in the Middle East who lived in Iran during 
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the revolution, remembers a case that illustrates the situation. The religious 
organization of Yazd led by Ayatollah Sadduqi, a Khomeini supporter and a 
prominent religious leader in Yazd, proclaimed 10 November 1977 a 
mourning day. It was completely observed and all the shops and businesses 
closed. The Bishop had to go outside the town to a designated repair shop to 
fix a flat tire on his car. When he asked the repairman why his shop was 
open, the man said: 
According to an order by the Aqa (Ayatollah Sadduqi) all 
the shops are closed. For the traveller's sake, this shop and 
another one at the other side of the town is open for 
business.42 
January 1978 was the decisive month for the revolution. At least five 
identifiable and important changes in the direction and structure of the 
revolution occurred. First, perhaps the most critical change took place when 
the government attacked Khomeini directly. The government's action had 
the unintended consequence of recognizing Khomeini as the leader of the 
opposition, over the National Front leadership and other high Ulama, such as 
Shariatmadari.43 Once the government identified Khomeini as the opposition 
leader, so did all of those traditionally-oriented status groups with a religious 
orientation, who, until then, may have been following another Marja.44 On 
19 and 20 January 1978, when the Tehran bazaar closed, the call came from 
both Khomeini and Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front 
Organization — a secular organization. Sanjabi's action convinced other 
secular organizations and groups to accept Khomeini's leadership. 
Second, recognition of Khomeini as the leader by all of the contending 
forces provided the opportunity for his organization to take control of the 
movement, and to determine the direction of the revolution. As a result of 
these two vicissitudes, the final three changes of the five being described 
were introduced into the revolutionary process. Third, under the religious 
leadership the relatively spontaneous nature of the resistance changed to 
become more disciplined and organized. Fourth, all the slogans and demands 
changed from the more economic (bread and butter) issues to the more 
ideological-Islamic ones. Fifth, the government, which was trying to reach a 
compromise with the secular opposition, faced a powerful block that would 
not settle for anything less than the elimination of the ancien regime.*5 
The first organized and efficiently administered demonstration occurred 
on 9 January 1978 in the city of Qum, a protest precipitated by the 
government's publication of a slanderous article about Khomeini.46 The 
demonstrators called for Khomeini's return, the establishment of an Islamic 
Republic, and the death of the Shah. From then on, the religious opposition 
and religiously-motivated masses were in control. And, perhaps it could be 
claimed that by this time the people no longer recognized the state's 
legitimacy to rule and they began to obey an alternative power — themselves. 
For nearly fourteen months, the Qum bazaar remained closed, and only 
bakers, butchers, and men who sold produce off barrows in the streets kept 
operating in a normal fashion. Qum received all of its food and clothing 
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through local mosques.47 This was more or less the situation in most of the 
urban centers. 
After Khomeini's exile in 1964, almost all of the prominent religious 
leaders, with the exception of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, were on the SAVAK 
list and had spent a major part of the fifteen years between the 1963 uprising 
and the 1978-1979 revolution either in prison or in internal exile. Rouhani 
claims that by 1965 fifty-four high ranking religious leaders were in the 
Shah's prisons.48 
After January 1978, the community mosque became the center of power, 
replacing all government apparatus. Led by preachers who often suffered 
reprisals by the government, every mosque became a center of resistance to 
the authorities. Ayatollah Mohammad Sadduqi preached in Yazd, Shaykh 
Mohammad Hashemian in Rafsanjan, Hojat al-Islam Mahdavi Kani (who had 
received repeated prison terms and who became the Minister of the Interior 
after the revolution) led congregational prayers at the Jalili Mosque. 
Ayatollah Reza Sa'idi, a former student of Khomeini, preached at the Qiathi 
Mosque. Sa'idi, who was arrested in 1970 for preaching against American 
investment in Iran, died under torture. Husayn Ghaffari, who preached at 
Khatam al-Osya and the al-Hadi Mosques in Tehran, was arrested in 1974 for 
comparing the Shah to Mu'awiyyah,49 and also died under torture. Ayatollah 
Mahmud Taleqani, who preached at the Hedayat Mosque, had spent years in 
the Shah's prison. 
This pattern occurred in other cities and towns throughout Iran. 
Ayatollah Mahalati, who preached at the Mo'la Mosque in Shiraz, called for 
an armed struggle in his sermons. Ayatollah Taheri, who preached at the 
Jumi mosque of Isfahan, was arrested (August 1978), dragged from his bed in 
the middle of the night, and taken to Tehran. The next day, the Isfahanis 
established a bast (sanctuary) in the home of another Ulama, Ayatollah 
Khademi. On the tenth day of the bast, Isfahanis took to the streets setting 
fire to eighty-five banks as well as fire-bombing the Shahr-i Frang Cinema 
and two luxury hotels, the Poul and the Shah Abass. The security forces 
opened fire and hundreds were killed. Shaul Bakhash describes the 
revolutionary process: 
It was after listening to mosque sermons, in a pattern that 
occurred again and again, that crowds emerged in large 
cities like Shiraz and Yazd, and small towns like 
Shahsavar, Jahrom and Behbahan, to demonstrate, protest, 
clash with security forces and attack particular targets.50 
The total collapse of government authority came in December 1978. 
From then on, the religious organizations controlled the country and ran it 
from the community mosques. Anthony Parsons, the British ambassador to 
Iran, remembers that even the capital was in the hands of the opposition. 
Even in Tehran the police had disappeared and traffic was 
being directed, rather efficiently, by young civilians. Food 
and fuel for the poor in the cities, including Tehran, was 
being distributed by the mosque, not by the authorities.51 
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Two important factors in the organization of the Iranian revolution 
helped to maintain its radical posture during these fifteen years: the 
charismatic leadership of Khomeini, who kept his radical stand against the 
regime without compromise; and the domination of the leadership of the 
opposition organization in Iran by community mosque leaders, rather than by 
the high Ulama. Almost all of the demonstrations were initiated, organized 
and led from the mosque (in the name of Khomeini) by the preachers, 
religious students and lay-organizers in charge of mosques. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Iran has few equals in the world insofar as the number and intensity of its 
rebellions and revolutions in the last one hundred years. The two major mass 
uprisings, which rightly deserve to be called revolutions, were the 
Constitutional revolution of 1906-1911 and the revolution of 1978-1979. 
Both revolutions were preceded by less dramatic events that were preludes to 
these major social and political upheavals. The Constitutional revolution of 
1906-1911 followed the Tobacco rebellion of 1891-1892, and the seeds of the 
1978-1979 revolution were sown in the June 1963 uprising. It is coincidental 
that both intervals were fifteen years. 
It is also an historical fact that in these minor and major upheavals 
religious leaders played crucial and determining roles. Although individuals 
changed, the triangle alliance among the clergy, the bazaar, and the 
intellectuals, first forged in the Tobacco rebellion, remained in effect in all of 
these uprisings. The clergy and the intellectuals provided leadership, the 
bazaar financed the operations, and the mosques organized community 
grassroots and close-knit networks that made recruitment and mass 
mobilization possible. 
As this essay has emphasized, a major feature of the Iranian revolution 
was the important role played by pre-existing community networks, with their 
friendship and kinship relationships, in disseminating revolutionary ideology 
and recruiting support. It is ironic that, after more than fifty years of rapid 
modernization and Westernization by the Pahlavi dynasty, the traditional 
neighborhood organizations and committees, and not modern political parties, 
took the lead for social change. 
The revolution of 1978-1979 was a popular revolution, and of the 
millions of people who participated, not all were muslims, Shi'ites, or those 
inspired to build an Islamic Republic. The Shah's brutal policies of 
eliminating all the secular forces opposing his regime were more successful 
than his efforts to crush the religious opposition. He easily claimed that the 
Tudeh party and the Fada'i guerrillas were agents of world communism, but 
to make people believe that the clergy were agents of foreign powers proved 
to be impossible. He called the Mujahedeen "Islamic Marxists" and the name 
stuck, but when he called the clergy "the red and black reactionaries" and 
labelled Khomeini "an adventurer, without faith, . . . a man with a dubious 
past, tied to more superficial and reactionary colonialists," his slurs backfired 
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and resulted in three days of bloody riots that swept all the major Iranian 
cities in June 1963. 
This essay has attempted to draw connections between the unsuccessful 
1963 uprising and the popular revolution of 1978-1979. This study maintains 
that two major factors were missing from the 1963 rioting: a unified 
leadership and a centralized nationwide organization that could bring all the 
neighborhood networks under one banner and lead them in one direction. 
The 1963 riot brought Khomeini into the political arena, and his banishment 
and exile to Iraq provided him with relative immunity from the oppressive 
and coercive power of the state. Whereas many of his colleagues suffered 
and were forced to compromise. As the state's pressure for absolute 
conformity and its vicious treatment of the dissidents increased, some were 
forced to compromise, others were coopted and many were imprisoned, 
tortured and killed. Khomeini's relatively safe position gave him the 
opportunity to keep his uncompromising opposition to the Shah intact. 
Khomeini's preponderant revolutionary credentials and his resolute stand 
against the Shah gained him the respect and admiration of both the secular 
and the religious opposition. By 1978, when his extensive organizational 
networks inside the country managed to disseminate his appeals, statements, 
and messages to the Iranian people, he emerged as the only man who could 
unite the diverse opposition groups under a common slogan. The phrase "the 
Shah must go" (Shah bayad Beravad) advocated the most radical plan of 
action, and proved to be the only slogan acceptable to both the secular and 
religious opposition. Thus, Khomeini's charisma and impeccable credentials 
provided traditionally-trusted leadership, and the time-honored, historically-
legitimized community organizations provided the center for mobilization. 
Without these two factors, the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 might never 
have happened. 
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Appendix 1 
Middle Class Religiously-Oriented Organizations formed during the 
revolutionary process and associated with The Islamic Coalition Councils 
(HMD 
1. Muslim Crusaders (Mosalmanan-i Mojahed). 
2. Council of United Muslims (Shura-ye Musalmanan-i Mottahed). 
3. Movement of Free Muslims (Jonbesh-i Mosalmanan-i Azadeh) with 
more than 500 members in Tehran. 
4. Society for Struggling Clergy (Majma-i Ruhaniyun-i Mojahed). 
5. Revolutionary Movement of Iranian Muslims (JAMA) led by Dr. Kazem 
Saami, an advocate of Islamic Socialism. 
6. The Movement (Junbesh). 
7. The Islamic Movement of the Iranian People (Junbesh-i Islami-ye 
Mardum-i Iran). 
8. The Movement of Militant Muslims (Junbesh-i Muslamanan-i Mobarez). 
The Movement was led by a dentist, Dr. Payman, and emerged in 1965. 
9. The Islamic Freedom-Loving Party (Hezb-i Azadekhahan-i Islam) with 
membership coming mostly from the medical profession. 
10. The Amal Group (Sazeman-i Amal) with connections to an organization 
with the same name as the Shi'ites in Lebanon. Dr. Chamran, Mohandes 
Qarazi, and Jalaladdin Farsi, all members of Khomeini's inner circle, 
spent years of training in Lebanon with the PLO, and were active 
members of Amal. After the revolution, Chamran became the head of the 
irregular army in the Iran-Iraq war and later was killed; Qarazi became 
governor of oil-rich Khuzestan and later minister of oil, and Farsi was 
appointed as a member of the Council on the Cultural Revolution. 
11. The Revolutionary Organization of the Masses of the Islamic Republic 
(Sazeman-i Inqelabi-ye Jumhuri-ye Islami). 
12. Islamic Society of Engineers (Anjuman-i Islami-ye Mohandeseen). With 
close cooperation with the Freedom Movement. Four ministers in 
Bazargan's Cabinet were members of this organization (Taheri, 
Mo'infar, Katira'i, and Taj). 
13. The Liberation Movement of Iran (Nehzat-i Azadi-ye Iran). 
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